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1. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, many NP-hard optimization problems have been shown to be
hard even to approximate. One current question of interest is how to know when
the limit of inapproximability has been reached, and the problem becomes either
tractable or at least not NP-hard to approximate. Two cases where the limits have
been marked are the min-set-cover problem and the max-3SAT. For the min-set-cover
problem, the greedy approximation algorithm achieves a factor of approximation ln n,
whereas achieving any factor of approximation smaller than it is infeasible [18], unless
NPP (quasi-polynomial time). For the max-3SAT problem, a recent algorithm
of [36] achieves an approximation ratio of 87 , whereas by [33] achieving any better
constant factor of approximation would imply NP=P.
In this work, another possibility emerges as to how to show the limit of NP-hardness
of approximization. In particular, it is known that the closest vector problem (CVP)
is NP-hard to approximate within any constant factor and is infeasible to approximate
within 2log
1&=n (\=>0) unless NP is in P [6]. In this paper we show a constant-round
interactive proof system for a (promise) problem capturing the approximation of
CVP to within a factor of - n. This seems to indicate that it will be impossible to
show an NP-hardness type result for approximation factor - n. In particular, unless
coNPAM (which in particular would collapse the polynomial-time hierarchy
[12]), such a result cannot be proven via a (randomized) many-to-oneKarp
reduction. Furthermore, one would need to use a TuringCook reduction which
makes queries outside of the promise; for further discussion see Section 6. We note
that such reductions have not be used so far in the context of proving nonapproxi-
mability results.
1.1. The Computational Problems Considered
We consider two computational problems regarding integer lattices, the CVP,
and the SVP. In both cases, the dominant parameter seems to be the dimension of
the lattice, denoted n. The lattice is represented by a basis, denoted B, which is
an n-by-n nonsingular matrix over R. The lattice, L(B), is the set of points which
can be expressed as integer linear combinations of the columns of B (i.e.,
L(B) =def [Bc: c # Zn]).
The closest vector problem. An input of the CVP problem consists of an n-dimen-
sional lattice L and a target point t in Rn. The desired output is a point c in L which
is closest to t (where closest is defined with respect to a variety of norms).
The CVP problem is NP-hard for all lp norms, p1 (cf., van Emde Boas [47]).
Furthermore, the problem is NP-hard to approximate within any constant factor
(cf., [6]). The latter work also shows that if CVP could be approximated within
factor 2log
1&= n, for any =>0, then NPP . On the other hand, Babai showed that
CVP can be approximated within factor 2n by a modification of the LLL lattice
reduction algorithm [8], and improvements by [46, 34] yield approximation
within factor 2=(n) n, for =(n)=(log log n)2(log n)=o(1).
The problem of verifying the approximate optimality of a solution to the CVP
problem has also been considered. Given a point c in the lattice, its distance to t
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clearly provides an upper bound on the minimum distance of t to the lattice, but
there is no known way to verify in polynomial time that this distance in indeed
minimal. Lagarias et al. [39] showed, using reductions to the problem of comput-
ing KorkineZolotarev bases, that polynomial-size proofs exist that can be verified
in polynomial time that a vector c is within factor n1.5 of the closest (to t) lattice
vector. An improved bound of O(n) was obtained by Ha# stad [32] and Banaszczyk [9],
using dual lattices.
The shortest vector problem. The SVP problem was formulated by Dirichlet in
1842. An input of the SVP problem is an n-dimensional lattice L, and the desired
output is a nonzero point c in L of minimum length (where length is measured
with respect to a variety of norms).4
The SVP problem has been known to be NP-hard in l (cf., [47]) and recently
proved by Ajtai to be NP-hard (under randomized reductions) for the Euclidean
l2 norm [2]. Even more recently, Micciancio [42] has proven that it is NP-hard
(again under randomized reductions) to approximate the shortest vector problem
in l2 -norm to within any constant factor smaller than - 2. The famous LLL lattice
reduction algorithm [40] provides a polynomial-time approximation for SVP with
an approximation factor of 2n2, and improvements by [46] achieve approximation
within factor 2=(n) n, for =(n)=(log log n)2(log n)=o(1).
The problem of verifying the approximate optimality of a solution to the SVP
problem has also been considered. The work of Lagarias et al. [39] implies that
polynomial-size proofs exist that can be verified in polynomial time that a vector
c in the lattice is within factor n of the shortest vector in the lattice. An alternative
proof was suggested by Cai [14].
1.2. New Results: Short Interactive Proofs for Approximate CVP and SVP
Hardness of approximation results for an optimization problem 8 are typically
shown by reducing some hard problem (e.g., an NP-hard language) to a promise
problem5 related to the approximation of 8. The approximation promise problem
consists of a pair of subsets, (6YES , 6NO), such that instances in 6YES have a
much better value than those in 6NO . The gap between these values represents the
approximation slackness, and distinguishing yes instances from no instances
captures the approximation task. In accordance with this methodology, which has
been applied in all work regarding hardness of approximation, we formulate
promise problems capturing the approximation of CVP (resp., SVP) within a factor
of g(n).
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4 An equivalent formulation used below refers to the minimum distance between a pair of distinct
lattice points.
5 A promise problem is a pair, (6YES , 6NO), of nonintersecting subsets of [0, 1]*. The subset 6YES
(resp., 6NO) corresponds to the yes instances (resp., no instances) of the problem. The promise is the
union of the two subsets; that is, 6YES _ 6NO . Promise problems are a generalization of standard
decision problems (i.e., language recognition problems) in which the promise holds for all strings (i.e.,
6YES _ 6NO=[0, 1]*).
Notation. By dist(v, u) we denote the Euclidean distance between the vectors
v, u # Rn. Extending this notation, we let dist(v, L(B)) denote the distance of v from
the lattice, L(B), spanned by the basis B. That is,
dist(v, L(B)) =def min
u # L(B)
[dist(v, u)].
The CVP promise problem (GapCVP). We consider the promise problem GapCVPg ,
where g: N [ N (the gap function) is a function of the dimension.
v yes instances (i.e., satisfying closeness) are triples (B, v, d) where B is a basis
for a lattice in Rn, v is a vector in Rn, d # R and dist(v, L(B))d.
v no instances (i.e., strongly violating closeness) are triples (B, v, d ) where B
is a basis for a lattice in Rn, v # Rn is a vector, d # R, and dist(v, L(B))>g(n) } d.
For any g1, the promise problem GapCVPg is in NP (i.e., in the extension of NP
to promise problems): The NP-witness for (B, v, d ) being a yes-instance is merely
a vector u # L(B) satisfying dist(v, u)d. By [34, 40, 46], GapCVP2 =n is decidable
in polynomial time, for every =>0. No polynomial-time algorithm is known for
smaller gap factors and the problem is NP-hard for any constant factor and quasi-
NP-hard for a 2log
0.999 n factor (cf., [6]).
Here we present a constant-round interactive proof system for the complement of
the above promise problem with g(n)=o(- n). That is, we will show an interactive
proof in which very-far instances (no instances) are always accepted, whereas close
instances (yes instances) are accepted with negligible probability. Specifically, we
show that
Theorem 1.1. GapCVP- nO(log n) is in coAM.
Recall that by [9, 32, 39] GapCVPn is in coNP. Thus, we have placed a poten-
tially harder problem (i.e., referring to smaller gaps) in a potentially bigger class
(i.e., coNPcoAM). Unlike the proofs of [9, 32, 39], which relies on deep
results regarding lattices, our proof is totally elementary.
The SVP promise problem (GapSVP). We consider the promise problem GapSVPg ,
where g (the gap function) is again a function of the dimension. Without loss of
generality, one may set v1 (below) to be the origin, recovering the more standard
formulation of the problem.
v yes instances (i.e., having short vectors) are pairs (B, d ) where B is a basis
for a lattice L(B) in Rn, d # R, and dist(v1 , v2)d for some v1 {v2 in L(B).
v no instances (i.e., strongly violating short vectors) are pairs (B, d ) where B
and d are as above but dist(v1 , v2)>g(n) } d for all v1 {v2 in L(B).
Again, for any g1, the promise problem GapSVPg is in NP, the problem GapCVP2 =n
is decidable in polynomial time (for every =>0), but no polynomial-time algorithm
is known for smaller gap factors (and the problem is NP-hard for any constant gap
smaller than - 2 [2, 42]).
We present a constant-round interactive proof system for the complement of the
above promise problem with g(n)=o(- n). That is, we will show that no instances
are always accepted, whereas yes instances are accepted with negligible probability.
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Theorem 1.2. GapSVP- nO(log n) is in coAM.
Recall that by [39] GapCVPn is in coNP. Again, in contrast to [39], our proof
is elementary.
On the complexity of unique-SVP. Using our results, Cai has recently proved
that the following promise problem, called f (n)-unique SVP, is in coNP & AM
for f (n)= 4- nO(log n). The input to the problem is a pair (B, v), and the promise
is that the shortest vector in L(B), denoted u, is f (n)-unique in the sense that for
every u$ # L(B) if &u$& f (n) } &u& then u$ is an integer multiple of u. The problem
is to distinguish the case when v is the shortest vector of L(b) from the case it is
not. Cai (cf., [14]) has shown a many-to-one reduction of f (n)-unique SVP to the
complement of GapSVPg , for g(n)= f (n) } - f (n)2&0.25 (which is approximately
f (n)2, provided f (n)=|(1)).
Comment on zero-knowledge. Our constant-round interactive proofs for the
complement of GapCVP- nO(log n) and the complement of GapSVP- nO(log n) are
actually perfect zero-knowledge (PZK) with respect to an honest verifier. Using
recent results regarding zero-knowledge proof systems [26, 44, 45], it follows that
both these problems as well as their complements have (general) statistical zero-
knowledge proof systems (i.e., are in SZK). Specifically, honest-verifier statistical
zero-knowledge (SZK) proofs (of which honest-verifier PZK is a special case) are
closed under complementation [44], and this holds also for promise problems
[45]. Furthermore, honest-verifier SZK proofs can be transformed into ones of the
public-coin type [44], and by [26] the latter can be transformed into general SZK
proofs (i.e., robust against any verifier strategy).
Comment on other norms. Our proof systems can be adapted to any lp norm
(and in particular to l1 and l). Specifically, we obtain constant-round (HVPZK)
interactive proof systems for gap nO(log n) (rather than gap - nO(log n) as in l2
norm). The result extends to any computationally tractable norm as defined in
Section 5. (Except for Section 5, the rest of the paper refers to CVP and SVP in
l2 norm.)
Comment on computational problems regarding linear codes. Our proof systems
can be easily adapted to the corresponding nearest and lightest codeword problems
for linear codes.6 In both cases the obtained gap is nO(log n), where n is the length
of the codewords. As suggested by Madhu Sudan (private communication, 1997),
for the nearest codeword problem, a similar bound can be obtained by using the
standard reduction of the coding problem to CVP in l1 norm.
Alternative proof systems by Micciancio. The ideas underlying our proof systems
have been recently used by Micciancio [43] to derive somewhat different proof
systems for the same promise problems. For details see Section 8.
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6 This fact, not stated in our preliminary posting on ECCC, was discovered independently by
Alekhnovich [4].
1.3. Implication on Proving Nonapproximability of CVP and SVP
In [25], the existence of an AM-proof system for graph non-isomorphism (GNI)
was taken as evidence to the belief that graph isomorphism (GI) is unlikely to be
NP-complete. The reasoning was that a reduction (even a Cook reduction) of
NP to GI would imply that coNP is in AM, and thus that the polynomial-time
hierarchy collapses [12].
We have to be more careful when promise problems are concerned. If NP is
Karp-reducible to GapCVP- n (or to any promise problem in NP & coAM) then
it follows that coNPAM. However, it is not clear what happens (in general) if
NP is Cook-reducible to a promise problem in NP & coAM. The difficulty is
with the case in which the Cook reduction makes some queries for which the promise
does not hold. For such a query the validity of the answer is not necessarily provable
via an AM system. Thus, NP may be Cook-reducible to a promise problem in
NP & coAM and still coNPAM may not hold. In fact, Even et al. [17,
Theorem 4] constructed an NP-hard promise problem in NP & coNP (and
coNPNP does not seem to follow). Restricting our attention to smart reduc-
tions [30], which are Cook reductions for which all queries satisfy the promise, we
show that if NP is reducible to a promise problem in NP & coAM via a smart
reduction, then coNPAM.
Our results thus imply that (at least) one of the following three must hold :
1. (Most probable): GapCVP- n is not NP-hard.
2. GapCVP- n is NP-hard but only with a reduction which is not many-to-
one and furthermore makes queries which violate the promise.
3. (Most improbable): coNPAM and in particular the polynomial-time
hierarchy collapses.
Ruling out the third possibility, we view our results as establishing limits on results
regarding the hardness of approximating CVP and SVP: Approximations to within
a factor of - n are either not NP-hard or their NP-hardness must be established via
reductions which make queries violating the promise (of the target promise problem).
See Section 6 for further discussion.
We note that Arora et al. [6] have essentially conjectured that GapCVP- n is
NP-hard. The above can be taken as evidence that the conjecture is false.
Remark. We note that in discussions in the literature (cf. [6]), the result of
Lagarias et al. [39] is taken mistakenly to mean that approximating CVP within
n1.5 cannot be NP-hard, unless coNPNP. The possibility of NP-hardness via
nonsmart Cook-reductions is ignored, although it does apply there as well. What
can be said is that [37] implies that a proof that approximating CVP within n1.5
is NP-hard either will employ nonsmart Cook-reductions or would imply that
coNPNP.
The cryptographic angle. Interest in the complexity of GapCVP and GapSVP has
increased recently since versions of both have been suggested as basis for cryptographic
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primitives and schemes (cf. [1, 23, 3]). In particular, in a pioneering work [1],7 Ajtai
has constructed a one-way function assuming that GapSVPn c is hard (in worst
case), where c>11.8 Ajtai and Dwork [3] proposed a public-key encryption scheme
whose security is reduced to a special case of (a search version of ) GapSVPnc (with
some big c). Interestingly, the trapdoor permutation suggested in [23] relies on the
conjectured difficulty of the closest vector problem. On the other hand, GapCVP2log1&= n
is quasi-NP-hard [6], and GapSVP- 2&= is NP-hard [2, 42], for any =>0. An
immediate question which arises is whether the security of a cryptographic system
can be based on the difficulty of GapCVPg(n) or GapSVPg(n) for a function g for
which these approximation problems are NP-hard (or, say, quasi-NP-hard). Our
results indicate that g(n) may need to be o(- nlog n).
The above raises again an old question regarding the possibility, in general, of
basing the security of cryptosystems on the assumption that P{NP. We discuss
this question in Section 7.
2. PRELIMINARIES
In this section we present some preliminaries regarding computational problems
in the geometry of numbers. We also recall the standard definitions of complexity
classes such as AM.
2.1. On the Geometry of Numbers
Throughout the paper we let dist(v, u) denote the Euclidean distance between the
vectors v, u # Rn. Extending this notation to sets of vectors, we let dist(V, U) =def
minu # U, v # V[dist(v, u)]. In particular, we will be interested in dist(v, L(B)), the
distance of v from the lattice, L(B)=[Bc: c # Zn], spanned by the basis B. Unless
stated otherwise (i.e., in Section 5), we denote by &v& the Euclidean length of the
vector v # Rn (i.e., &v&=dist(v, 0n)).
For a set of vectors URn and a vector v # Rn, we denote by U+v the set of
vectors obtained by adding a single vector from U to v. That is,
U+v =def [v+u : u # U ]. (1)
Thus, for example, dist(u, L(B)+v) is the minimum over all c # Zn of dist(u, Bc+v).
Finite versus infinite precision. To facilitate the exposition, we assume that all
operations are done with infinite precision. This is neither possible nor needed. In
reality the inputs (i.e., the vectors) are given in rational representation, so let m
denote the number of bits in the largest of the corresponding integers. Then making
all calculations with poly(n) } m bits of precision introduces an additional stochastic
deviation of less than 2&n in our bounds.
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7 The fundamental aspect of that work, not discussed here, is the reduction of a worst-case problem
to an average-case one.
8 The constant has been recently reduced to c>5 by Cai and Nerurkar [15].
Uniformly selecting a point in the unit sphere. One may just invoke the general
algorithm of Dyer et al. [16]. Using this algorithm, it is possible to select almost
uniformly a point in any convex body (given by a membership oracle). Alter-
natively, one may select the point by generating n samples from the standard normal
distribution and normalize the result so that a vector of length r1 appears with
probability proportional to r&n (see, e.g., [38, Section 3.4.1]).
Selecting random lattice points. Intuitively, in our proof systems, we would like
to select a random lattice point. Given that the lattice is infinite, this is not really
feasible. Instead, we will select a lattice point almost uniformly among the lattice
points in a huge sphere. The sphere will be huge with respect to the given basis, and
so our selection will be almost independent of the specific basis. Technically, we
define the norm of a set of vectors (e.g., a basis for a lattice), V, as the length of
the longest vector in the set (i.e., &V&=maxv # V[&v&]). Given a basis B/Rn, we
consider the following procedure.
1. Uniformly select a point in the n-dimensional sphere of radius l =def 2n } &B&
centered at the origin. Let r # Rn be the resulting point.
2. Write r as a linear combination of the basis vectors (i.e., solve the linear
system Bx=r for x).
3. Rounding x, in some canonical way, obtain a lattice point. For example,
one may set c to be the integer vector closest to x and obtain the lattice point Bc.
We show that the above process produces lattice points with distribution which is
statistically close to the uniform distribution over the lattice points of length at
most l. That is,
Proposition 2.1. Let B and l be as above, and let ‘ be a random variable represent-
ing the outcome of the above random process. Let H =def [v: &v&l]. Then, the statistical
difference between ‘ and the uniform distribution over H & L(B) is at most exp(&0(n)).
Proof. This procedure partitions the sphere H into cells: most of them are
parallelepipeds that are isomorphic to the basic cellparallelepiped defined by the
lattice L(B). The exceptions are the partial parallelepipeds which are divided by
the boundary of the sphere H. All the latter parallelepipeds are contained between
two cocentered spheres, the larger being of radius l&n } &B&(2n+n) } &B& and
the smaller being of radius l&n } &B&(2n&n) } &B&. Thus, the fraction of these
(divided) parallelepipeds in the total number of parallelepipeds is bounded above
by the volume encompassed between the above two spheres divided by the volume
of the smaller sphere. This relative volume is at most
(2n+n)n&(2n&n)n
(2n&n)n
=\1+ 2n2n&n+
n
&1
<
3n2
2n
.
(Assuming n4.) It follows, that the above procedure generates random lattice
points in a distribution which is at most poly(n) } 2&n away from the uniform
distribution over L(B) & H. K
547NONAPPROXIMABILITY OF LATTICE PROBLEMS
2.2. AM and Constant-Round Interactive Proofs
To simplify the exposition we extend the definition of standard complexity classes
to promise problem (cf. [17]). For example, a promise problem 6=(6YES , 6NO)
is said to be in NP if there exists a polynomial-time recognizable (witness) relation
R so that
v For every x # 6YES there exists a y # [0, 1]* such that (x, y) # R (and
| y|=poly( |x| )).
v For every x # 6NO and every y # [0, 1]*, (x, y)  R.
We extend the standard definition of interactive proof systems to promise problems
(cf., [24]).
Definition 1 (interactive proof systems (IP) [28]). An interactive proof system
for a promise problem 6=(6YES , 6NO) is a two-party game, between a verifier
which executes a probabilistic polynomial-time strategy (denoted V ) and a prover
which executes a computationally unbounded strategy (denoted P), satisfying
v (Perfect) completeness: For every x # 6YES the verifier V always accepts
after interacting with the prover P on common input x.
v Soundness: For some positive polynomial p, for every x # 6NO and every
potential strategy P*, the verifier V rejects with probability at least 1p( |x| ) , after
interacting with P* on common input x.
In such a case, we say that the proof system has soundness error 1& 1p( |x| ) .
The following special cases will be of interest to us.
v In case the verifier is such that for some constant c>0 and every x # [0, 1]*,
the verifier decides after receiving at most c messages (from the prover), we say that the
verifier (or the proof system) is constant-round. Specifically, we may say that it is
c-round.
v In case the prescribed verifier’s strategy amounts to sending uniformly
chosen messages at each round, and deciding whether to accept by evaluating a
polynomial-time predicate of its view of the interaction, we say that the verifier (or
the proof system) is of public-coin type.
v AM is defined as the class of promise problems having public-coin one-
round proof system of soundness error 12.
We recall that soundness error in interactive proof systems (of perfect completeness)
may be easily reduced by parallel repetition.9 Thus, given an arbitrary constant-round
interactive proof system for a problem 6, we may convert it to a constant-round
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9 For a proof of this folklore theorem, see [21, Appendix C.1]. We mention that a somewhat more
involved argument applies also to interactive proof systems with nonperfect completeness (which we did
not define) [10].
interactive proof system with exponentially vanishing soundness error (for 6). We
also recall two more complex transformations.
1. Any constant-round interactive proof system can be converted into a
constant-round public-coin interactive proof system for the same promise problem.
This transformation, presented by Goldwasser and Sipser [29] in the context of
languages, does extend to promise problems. Furthermore, it preserves exponentially
vanishing soundness error.
2. Any constant-round public-coin interactive proof system can be converted
into one having one round. This transformation, presented by Babai [7] in the
context of languages, also extends to promise problems and preserves exponentially
vanishing soundness error.
2.3. Zero-Knowledge
Our main results are the existence of certain constant-round interactive proof
systems. It turns out that these proof systems have some zero-knowledge [28]
property (defined below). A reader who does not care about this extra property
may skip the following definition as well as any reference to zero-knowledge made
in the sequel.
Definition 2 (honest-verifier perfect zero-knowledgeHVPZK). (The view of
an interactive machine consists of the common input, its internal coin tosses, and
all messages it has received.) An interactive proof system (P, V ) for a promise
problem 6=(6YES , 6NO) is honest-verifier perfect zero-knowledge if there exists a
probabilistic polynomial-time machine (called a simulator), S, so that for every
x # 6YES the output S(x) is distributed identically to the view of V when interacting
with P on common input x.
Parallel repetition does preserve perfect zero-knowledge w.r.t. the honest verifier.
This will be useful when decreasing the error probability, while preserving the
number of rounds (via parallel repetitions).
3. (HVPZK) CONSTANT-ROUND PROOF FOR NONCLOSENESS
We consider the promise problem GapCVPg defined in the Introduction and
present a constant-round interactive proof system for the complement of the above
problem for gap g(n)=- nO(log n). Recall that the input is a triple (B, v, d ), where
B is a basis for a lattice, v is a vector, and d # R. That is, we will show that no
instances (in which v is at distance greater than g(n) } d from the lattice) are always
accepted, whereas yes instances (in which v is within distance d from L(B)) are
accepted with probability bounded away from 1.
The proof system. Consider a huge sphere, denoted H. Specifically, we consider
a sphere of radius 2n } &(B, v)& centered at the origin, where &(B, v)& denotes the
length of the largest vector in B _ v. Let g= g(n).
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1. The verifier uniformly selects _ # [0, 1], a random lattice point in H,
denoted r, and an error vector, ’, uniformly distributed in a sphere of radius gd2.
The verifier sends x =def =r+_v+’ to the prover.
2. The prover responds with {=0 if dist(x, L(B))<dist(x, L(B)+v) and
{=1 otherwise.
3. The verifier accepts if and only if {=_.
Analysis of the protocol. By the above, it should be clear that the verifier’s
actions in the protocol can be implemented in probabilistic polynomial time. We
will show that, for g(n)=- nO(log n), the above protocol constitutes a (honest
verifier perfect zero-knowledge) proof system for the promise problem GapCVPg ,
with perfect completeness and soundness error bounded away from 1.
Claim 3.1 (perfect completeness). If dist(v, L(B))>g(n) } d then the verifier
always accepts (when interacting with the prover specified above).
Proof. Under the above hypothesis, for every point x (and in particular the
messages sent by verifier in Step 1), we have dist(x, L(B))+dist(x, L(B)+v)>gd
(or else dist(v, L(B))=dist(L(B)+v, L(B))dist(x, L(B)+v)+dist(x, L(B))dg).
Thus, for every message, x=r+_v+’, sent by the verifier we have
dist(x, L(B)+_v)=dist(r+’, L(B))&’&
dg
2
dist(x, L(B)+(1&_) } v)>gd&dist(x, L(B)+_v)
dg
2
.
Thus, it is always the case that dist(x, L(B)+_v)<dist(x, L(B)+(1&_) } v) and
the prover responds with {=_. K
Claim 3.2 (zero-knowledge). The above protocol is perfect (honest-verifier) zero-
knowledge over triples (v, B, d) satisfying dist(v, L(B))>g(n) } d.
Proof. The simulator just reads the verifier’s choice for the bit _, and returns it
as the prover’s message. Thus, the simulator’s output will consist of coins for the
verifier and the prover’s response. By the proof of Claim 3.1, this distribution is
identical to the verifier’s view in the real execution. K
Claim 3.3 (Soundness). Let c>0 and g(n) =def - n(c ln n); if dist(v, L(B))d
then, for sufficiently large n, no matter what the prover does, the verifier accepts with
probability at most 1&n&2c.
The above asserts that sufficiently large n, the soundness error of the proof
system is bounded away from 1. For smaller (fixed) dimension, one may replace the
protocol by an immediate computation using Lenstra’s algorithm [41]. The same
holds for Claim 4.3 below.
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3.1. Proof of the Soundness Claim
Let !0 (resp., !1) be a random variable representing the message sent by the
verifier conditioned on _=0 (resp., _=1). Below, we upper bound the statistical
distance between these two random variables by (1&2n&2c). Given this bound, we
have for any prover strategy P*
Pr(P*(!_)=_)= 12 } Pr(P*(!0)=0)+
1
2 } Pr(P*(!1)=1)
= 12+
1
2 } (Pr(P*(!0)=0)&Pr(P*(!1)=0))
 12+
1
2 } (1&2n
&2c)
=1&n&2c.
Thus, all that remains is to prove the above upper bound on the statistical distance
between !0 and !1 . Let u be a lattice vector closest to v, and v$=v&u (i.e.,
u=v&v$ # L(B) and &v$&d ). Then, the above random variables can be written
as
!0=r+’ (2)
!1=r+u+v$+’, (3)
where (in both cases) r is uniformly distributed in H$(B) =def L(B) & H and ’ is as
above. The statistical distance between the two random variables is due to two
sources:
1. The shift by the lattice vector u. In case _=1 the point r+u may be out
of the sphere H (whereas, by choice, r is always in H). However, since H is much
bigger than u this happens rarely (i.e., with probability at most 3n2 } 2&n ; see
above). Furthermore, the statistical difference between uniform distribution on H$
and the same distribution shifted by adding the lattice vector u is negligible. Specifi-
cally, we may bound it by n&2c>3n2 } 2&n.
2. The extra shift by the short vector v$. For each lattice point, p, we
consider the statistical distance between p+’ and p+v$+’, where ’ is as above.
This is the main source of statistical distance between !0 and !1 , and the rest of the
proof is devoted to upper bound it.
But first, let us turn the above discussion into a rigorous argument. Let 2(X, Y )
denote the statistical difference between the random variables X and Y. First
observe that for every S,
Pr(!1 # S )= :
r # H $(B)
1
|H$(B)|
} Pr(r+u+v$+’ # S )
= :
r # H $(B)&u
1
|H$(B)|
} Pr(r+v$+’ # S ),
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where, as in Eq. (1), H$(B)&u=[w&u : w # H$(B)]. Thus,
2(!0 , !1)=max
S
[Pr(!0 # S )&Pr(!1 # S )]
=max
S { :r # H $(B)
1
|H$(B)|
} Pr(r+’ # S )
& :
r # H $(B)&u
1
|H$(B)|
} Pr(r+v$+’ # S )=
max
S { :r # H $(B) & (H $(B)&u)
1
|H$(B)|
} |Pr(r+’ # S )&Pr(r+v$+’ # S )|=
+
|H$(B)"(H$(B)&u)|
|H$(B)|
max
S, r
[Pr(r+’ # S )&Pr(r+v$+’ # S )]+n&2c
max
r
[2(r+’, r+v$+’)]+n&2c.
Without loss of generality, we may fix r=0n. Thus, it suffices to consider the
statistical distance between ’ and v$+’, where ’ is as above. In the first case the
probability mass is uniformly distributed in a sphere of radius gd2 centered at 0n,
whereas in the second case the probability mass is uniformly distributed in a sphere
of radius gd2 centered at v$. Without loss of generality, we consider v$=(d, 0, ..., 0).
Normalizing the distributions (by division with gd2), it suffices to consider the
statistical distance between the following two distributions:
(D1) Uniform distribution in a unit sphere centered at the origin.
(D2) Uniform distribution in a unit sphere centered at point (=, 0, ..., 0),
where == dgd2=
2
g .
Observe that the statistical distance between the two distributions equals half the
volume of the symmetric difference of the two spheres divided by the volume of a
sphere. Thus, we are interested in the relative symmetric difference of the two
spheres. Recall two basic facts:
Fact 3.4 (e.g., [5, Vol. 2, Sec. 11.33, Ex. 4]). The volume of an n-dimensional
sphere of radius r is vn(r) =
def
(?n2(1((n2)+1))) } rn, where 1(x)=(x&1) } 1(x&1),
1(1)=1, and 1(0.5)=- ?.
Fact 3.5 (e.g., [37, Sec. 1.2.11.2, Exer. 6]). For sufficiently large real x>2,
1(x+1)r- 2?x } (xe)x. Thus, for sufficiently large integer, m>2,
1(m+0.5)
1(m)
r- mr
1(m+1)
1(m+0.5)
.
Lemma 3.6 (symmetric difference between close spheres). Let S0 (resp., S=) be a
unit sphere at the origin (resp., at distance = from the origin). Then relative volume
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of the symmetric difference between the spheres (i.e., the volume of the symmetric
difference divided by the volume of the sphere) is at most
2&= }
(1&=2)(n&1)2
3
} - n.
Our upper bound is not tight. Still, as shown below, the upper bound cannot be
decreased below 2&2 } (1&(=2)2)(n&1)2 } - n and both expressions are equivalent
as far as our application goes.
Proof. We will lower bound the volume of the intersection of S0 and S= . Specifi-
cally, we look at the maximal (n&1)-dimensional cylinder of height =, which is
centered at the axis connecting the centers of S0 and S= and is encompassed by
S0 & S= . See Fig. 1. The radius of this cylinder is - 1&=2. Thus, its volume (which
is a strict lower bound on the volume of S0 & S=) is = } vn&1(- 1&=2). Using Facts 3.4
and 3.5 we have
vol(S0 & S=)
vol(S0)
>
= } vn&1(- 1&=2)
vn(1)
=
= } (1&=2)(n&1)2 } vn&1(1)
vn(1)
== } (1&=2)(n&1)2 }
1((n2)+1)
- ? } 1((n2)+0.5)
r= } (1&=2)(n&1)2 }
- n2
- ?
>= } (1&=)(n&1)2
- n
3
.
The lemma follows. K
FIG. 1. The cylinder encompassed by S0 and S= . The axis of the cylinder is marked in bold and the
radius of its base x=(1&=2)0.5 is computed from the center of the left sphere.
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Using Lemma 3.6, with ==2g(n)=- (4c ln n)n, we upper bound the statistical
distance between distributions (D1) and (D2) by
1
2
} \2&= - n } (1&=
2)(n&1)2
3 +=1&
- 4c ln n
6
} \1&4c ln nn +
(n&1)2
<1&
- c ln n
3
} \1&2c ln nn2 +
n2
<1&3 } n&2c,
where the last inequality holds for sufficiently large n’s (which satisfy - c ln n }
(1& 2c ln nn2 )
n2>9 } n&2c). Thus, the statistical distance between !0 and !1 is bounded
by n&2c+1&3 } n&2c (where the extra n&2c term comes from the contribution of
the u-shift analyzed above). The soundness claim follows. K
On the relative tightness of Lemma 3.6. Let S0 (resp., S=) be as in the lemma.
Recall that the lemma asserts that vol(S0 & S=)>= } vn&1(- 1&=2). In contrast, we
show that vol(S0 & S=)<2 } vn&1(- 1&(=2)2). We consider the minimal (n&1)-
dimensional cylinder centered at the axis connecting the centers of S0 and S= and
encompassing their intersection. Its height is at most 2 and its radius is - 1&(=2)2,
and so the claim follows.
3.2. Conclusion
Combining Claims 3.13.3, we conclude that the complement of
GapCVP- nO(log n) has a (HVPZK) constant-round proof system (with soundness
error 1& 1poly(n)). Employing known transformations (see Section 2), we get
Theorem 3. The promise problem GapCVP- nO(log n) is in NP & coAM. Further-
more, the complement of GapCVP- nO(log n) has a HVPZK constant-round proof system.
The interesting part is the membership of GapCVP- n in coAM. This reduces the
gap factor for which efficient proof systems exists: Lagarias et al. [39], Ha# stad
[32], and Banaszczyk [9] have previously shown that GapCVPn is in coNP.
4. (HVPZK) CONSTANT-ROUND PROOF FOR NO SHORT-VECTOR
We consider the promise problem GapSVPg defined in the Introduction and
present a constant-round interactive proof system for the complement of the above
problem for gap g(n)=- nO(log n). Recall that the input is a pair (B, d ), where B
is a basis for a lattice and d # R. That is, we will show that instances in which the
shortest vector in L(B) has length greater than g(n) } d are always accepted,
whereas instances in which L(B) has a nonzero vector of length at most d are
accepted with probability bounded away from 1.
The proof system. Consider a huge sphere, denoted H (as in Section 3). Specifi-
cally, we consider a sphere of radius 2n } &B& centered at the origin. Let g= g(n).
554 GOLDREICH AND GOLDWASSER
1. The verifier uniformly selects a random lattice point, p, in H, and an error
vector, ’, uniformly distributed in a sphere of radius gd2. The verifier sends
p~ =def p+’ to the prover.
2. The prover sends back the closest lattice point to p~ .
3. The verifier accepts iff the prover has answered with p.
Claim 4.1 (perfect completeness). If every two distinct lattice points are at
distance greater than gd then the verifier always accepts.
Proof. Under the above hypothesis, for every point x (and in particular the
message sent by verifier in Step 1), we have at most one lattice vector v so that
dist(x, v)gd2 (or else dist(v1 , v2)dist(x, v1)+dist(x, v2)gd). Since we have
dist( p~ , p)gd2, the prover always returns p, where p and p~ are as in Step 1. K
Claim 4.2 (zero-knowledge). The above protocol is perfect (honest-verifier) zero-
knowledge over pairs (B, d ) for which every two distinct points in L(B) are at distance
greater than gd.
Proof. The simulator just reads the verifier’s choice p and returns it as the prover’s
message. Thus, the simulator’s output will consist of coins for the verifier and the
prover’s response. By the proof of Claim 4.1, this distribution is identical to the
verifier’s view in the real execution. K
Claim 4.3 (soundness). Let c>0 and g(n)- n(c ln n). If for some v1 {v2 in
L(B), dist(v1 , v2)d then, no matter what the prover does, the verifier accepts with
probability at most 1&n&2c.
Proof. Let p$ =def p+(v1&v2), where p is the lattice point chosen by the verifier
in Step 1. Clearly, dist( p, p$)d. Let ! be a random variable representing the
message actually sent by the verifier, and let !$=!+(v1&v2). Using the analysis in
the proof of Claim 3.3, we bound the statistical distance between these two random
variables by (1&3n&2n). (Note that ! corresponds to !0 and !$ corresponds to !1
with v$=v1&v2 .) Given this bound, we have for any prover strategy P*
Pr(P*(!)= p)(1&3n&2n)+Pr(P*(!$)= p)
2&3n&2n&Pr(P*(!$)= p$).
However, the event P*(!$)= p$ is almost as probable as P*(!)= p (with the only
difference in probability due to the case where p$ is outside the sphere H, which
happens with probability at most n&2n). Thus, we have
2 } Pr(P*(!)= p)<Pr(P*(!)= p)+Pr(P*(!$)= p$)+n&2n
2&2n&2n
and the claim follows. K
Conclusion. Again, combining the above protocol with known transformations
(see Section 2), we get
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Theorem 4. The promise problem GapSVP- nO(log n) is in NP & coAM. Further-
more, the complement of GapSVP- nO(log n) has a HVPZK constant-round proof system.
Again, the interesting part is the membership of GapSVP- n in coAM. This
reduces the gap factor for which efficient proof systems exist: Lagarias et al. [39]
have previously shown that GapSVPn is in coNP.
5. TREATING OTHER NORMS
The underlying ideas of Theorems 3 and 4 can be applied to provide (HVPZK)
constant-round proof systems for corresponding gap problems regarding any com-
putationally tractable norm and in particular for all lp -norms (e.g., the l1 and l
norms). The gap factor is, however, larger: nO(log n) rather than - nO(log n).
Tractable norms. Recall the norm axioms (for a generic norm & }&):
(N1) For every v # Rn, &v&0, with equality holding if and only if v is the
zero vector.
(N2) For every v # Rn and any : # R, &:v&=|:| } &v&.
(N3) For every v, u # Rn, &v+u&=&v&+&u& (triangle inequality).
To allow the verifier to conduct its actions in polynomial-time, we make the
additional two requirements
(N4) The norm function is polynomial-time computable. That is, there exists
a polynomial-time algorithm that, given a vector v and an accuracy parameter $
(in binary), outputs a number in the interval [&v&\$]. We stress that the algo-
rithm is uniform over all dimensions.
(N5) The unit sphere defined by the norm contains a ball of radius 2&poly(n)
centered at the origin and is contained in a ball of radius 2poly(n) centered at the
origin. That is, there exists a polynomial p so that for all n’s,
[v # Rn : &v&22&p(n)][v # Rn : &v&1][v # Rn : &v&22 p(n)],
where &v&2 is the Euclidean (l2) norm of v.
Note that axioms (N4) and (N5) are satisfied by all (the standard) lp-norms.10 On
the other hand, by [16], axioms (N4) and (N5) suffice for constructing a probabilistic
algorithm which, given n, generates in time poly(n) a vector which is almost uniformly
distributed in the n-dimensional unit sphere w.r.t the norm. Specifically, by axioms
(N2) and (N3), the unit sphere is a convex body, and axioms (N4) and (N5) imply
the existence of a so-called well-guaranteed weak membership oracle (cf., [31]) as
required by the convex body algorithm of Dyer et al. [16] (and its improvements;
e.g., [35]).
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10 Furthermore, for any lp-norm, there is a simple algorithm for uniformly selecting a point, (x1 , ..., xn),
in the corresponding unit sphere: Generate n independent samples, x1 , ..., xn , each with density function
e&x
p
, and normalize the result so that a vector of norm r1 appears with probability proportional to r&n.
Our protocols can be adapted to any norm satisfying the additional axioms (N4)
and (N5). Such norm is hereafter referred to as a tractable. Fixing any tractable
norm, we modify the protocols of the previous sections so that the error vector, ’,
is chosen uniformly among the vectors of norm less than g(n) d2 (rather than
being chosen uniformly in a Euclidean sphere of radius g(n) d2). Here we use
g(n) =def nO(log n). Clearly the completeness and zero-knowledge claims continue to
hold as they merely relied on the triangle inequality (i.e., norm axiom (N3)). In the
proof of the soundness claims, we replace Lemma 3.6 by the following lemma in
which distance refers to the above norm (rather than to the Euclidean norm):
Lemma 5.1 (symmetric difference between close spheres, general norm). For
every c>0, let p be a point at distance =<1 from the origin. Then the relative
symmetric difference between the set of points of distance 1 from the origin and the
set of points of distance 1 from p is at most 2 } (1&(1&=)n).
We comment that the bound is quite tight for both the l1 and the l norm. That
is, in both cases the (maximum possible) relative symmetric difference is at least
2&(1&(=2))n.11
Proof. Let Br0 (resp., B
r
p) denote the set of points of distance r from the origin
(resp., from p). The symmetric difference between B10 and B
1
p equals twice the
volume of B1p"B
1
0 . This volume is clearly upper bounded by the volume of B
1
p"B
1&=
p ,
since B1&=p B
1
0 by norm axiom (N3). By the norm axioms (N1) and (N2), the
volume of Brp is proportional to r
n. Thus, vol(B1p "B
1&=
p )vol(B
1
p)=1&(1&=)
n, and
the lemma follows. K
Using == 2g(n) and g(n)=nO(log n), we conclude that the proof systems have
soundness error bounded above by 1&(1& O(log n)n )
n=1& 1poly(n) . Repeating it
polynomially many times in parallel we get
Theorem 5. Both GapCVP and GapSVP, defined for any tractable norm and gap
factor nO(log n), are in NP & coAM. Furthermore, the complement promise
problems have HVPZK constant-round proof systems.
6. WHAT DOES IT MEAN?
Throughout this section, we refer to complexity classes of promise problems as
defined in Section 2. As stated in the Introduction, the fact that a promise problem
in NP & coNP (resp., AM & coAM) is NP-hard via arbitrary Cook reductions
does not seem to imply that NP=coNP (resp., coNPAM). However, such
a conclusion does hold in case NP-hardness is proven by a restricted type of Cook-
reductions, called smart reductions and defined by Grollmann and Selman [30].
Below, we extend their definition to randomized reductions. To be concrete we
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11 To verify the above claim for l , consider the point p=(=, =, ..., =). Clearly, the intersection of the
unit sphere centered at the origin and the unit sphere centered at p is (2&=)n, whereas each sphere has
volume 2n. For l1 , consider the point p=(=, 0, ..., 0). Again, the intersection is a sphere of radius
1&(=2) (according to the norm in consideration).
require a randomized reduction to be correct with probability at least 23. (Deter-
ministic reductions are viewed as a special case.)
Definition 6 (smart reduction). A smart reduction of a promise problem A to
a promise problem B is a probabilistic polynomial-time oracle machine that on any
input which satisfies the promise of A, with probability at least 23, decides
correctly while only making queries which satisfy the promise of B. More generally,
we consider as smart any randomized polynomial-time oracle machine M that
satisfies the following, for some polynomial-time computable function t: N [ [0, 1]
and positive polynomial p:
1. For every yes-instance x of A, with probability at least t( |x| ), the computa-
tion MB(x) accepts while making no queries violating the promise of B.
2. For every no-instance x of A, with probability at least 1&t( |x| )+
(1p( |x| )), the computation MB(x) rejects while making no queries violating the
promise of B.
Otherwise the reduction is called nonsmart.12
Interesting special cases include the one-sided cases t#1 (resp., t#1p), and the
two-sided case t#23 and p#3. We note that any many-to-oneKarp (possibly
randomized) reduction is smart, and that all known inapproximability results were
proven via such reductions of NP to a corresponding gap problem (such as
GapCVP). On the other hand, Grollmann and Selman proved [30, Theorem 2] that
if a NP-complete language has a smart deterministic reduction to a promise
problem in NP & coNP then NP=coNP. It is quite straightforward to adapt
their argument to obtain.
Theorem 7. Suppose that a NP-complete language has a smart (possibly
randomized) reduction to a promise problem in AM & coAM. Then coNPAM.
Proof. We start with the case of a deterministic reduction. Here, given any
coNP-language L, we use the smart (deterministic) reduction to the promise
problem 6 in order to construct an AM-proof system for L. On input x, the prover
sends to the verifier a transcript of an accepting computation of the reduction (i.e.,
the oracle-machine). This transcript includes queries to the 6-oracle and presumed
answers of this oracle. In addition, the prover proves that each of these answers is
correct by running the adequate AM-proof system (for either 6 or its complement).
Here we use the hypothesis that the reduction is smart (which implies that the
prover can always succeed in case x # L). We stress that all these AM-proofs are
run in parallel (cf., [21, Apdx. C.1]), and so the result is an MAM-proof system
(which can be converted into an AM-proof system [7]).
In case of a randomized (smart) reduction, we let the verifier select the random
input (to the reduction) and continue as above. The resulting protocol possesses an
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12 Unfortunately, the term ‘‘nonsmart’’ is somewhat misleadingto be nonsmart (in an essential way)
and yet work, the reduction must be quite ‘‘clever.’’ A term like ‘‘safe’’ or ‘‘honest’’ may have been more
suitable than ‘‘smart;’’ however, ‘‘honest’’ is taken and using ‘‘safe’’ may be confusing when talking about
cryptography.
adequate gap between the accepting probabilities in case of yes and no instances:
Specifically, any yes-instance x is accepted with probability at least t( |x| ), whereas
a no-instance x is rejected with probability at least (1&t( |x| )+(1p( |x| ))) }
(1&exp( |x| )) (equiv., accepted with probability at most t( |x| )&(1p( |x| ))+
exp( |x| )). This yields a proof system with nonperfect completeness. Using standard
amplification (cf. [10]) we obtain an AMAM-proof system with exponentially
vanishing completeness and soundness error, using [20] we eliminate the complete-
ness error, and using [7], we convert the resulting MAMAM-proof system into an
AM-proof system. K
Combining Theorems 3, 4 and 7, we have:
Corollary 8. If either GapCVP- n or GapSVP- n is NP-hard via smart reduc-
tions then coNPAM.
It is known that the CVP is NP-hard to approximate within any constant factor
and is hard to approximate within 2log
1&= n unless NP is in P (quasi-polynomial
time) [6]. (Both reductions are many-to-one.) Arora et al. [6] set as a challenge
to prove that GapCVP- n is NP-hard. The corollary above, however, can be taken
as evidence of the impossibility of proving such a NP-hardness result. Specifically,
unless coNPAM, such a result will have to be derived via a nonsmart Cook
reduction.
7. ON THE POSSIBILITY OF BASING CRYPTOGRAPHY ON
THE ASSUMPTION THAT P{NP
The discussion of the cryptographic angle in the Introduction raises again an old
question: Is it possible to base the security of cryptosystems on the difficulty of
NP-hard problems? A claim of impossibility is commonly attributed to Brassard.
However, what Brassard actually showed [13, Theorem 2, Item (2)ii] can be stated
as follows
Brassard’s Theorem. Consider a public-key encryption scheme with a deterministic
encryption algorithm, and suppose that the set of valid public-keys is in coNP. Then,
if the problem of retrieving the plaintext from the (ciphertext, public-key) pair is
NP-hard, then it follows that NP=coNP.
There are two problems with the hypothesis of this impossibility result, aside
from the well-known fact that worst-case hardness of retrieving the plaintext is an
inadequate notion of security of encryption schemes. The problems are, first, that
the encryption algorithm is postulated to be deterministic and, second, that the set
of valid public-keys for it is postulated to form a coNP-set. While these precondi-
tions are satisfied in certain encryption schemes (and in particular in the schemes
known at the time the claim was made, e.g., plain RSA), they are not satisfied in
probabilistic encryption schemes such as the GoldwasserMicali [27] and the
BlumGoldwasser scheme [11] (as well as to the recent lattice-based schemes of
[3, 23]). We mention that probabilistic encryption is essential to security as defined
in [27].
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Thus, Brassard’s Theorem does not rule out the possibility of basing cryp-
tography (or even public-key encryption) on the assumption that P{NP (even if
NP{coNP, as we do believe). Furthermore, such a possibility is not ruled out
even by extensions of Brassard’s Theorem of which we are aware (cf. [22]), and
which do cover some probabilistic encryption schemes (such as the above-men-
tioned [27, 11]).
8. ALTERNATIVE PROOF SYSTEMS BY MICCIANCIO
Micciancio’s basic idea (cf. [43]) is to replace the randomization over a huge
sphere by reduction modulo the fundamental cell defined by the given basis. That
is, for a basis B of Rn and a vector v # Rn, we define v$ =def v mod B to be the result
of taking the fractional part of B&1v multiplied by B (i.e., let x be the solution to
Bx=v, then v$=Bx$ where x$i=x i&wxi x # [0, 1)).
The proof system for the complement of GapCVPg . On input (B, v, d ), where B
is a basis in Rn, v # Rn and d # R, let g=g(n).
1. The verifier uniformly selects _ # [0, 1], and an error vector, ’, uniformly
distributed in a sphere of radius gd2. The verifier sends x =def _v+’ mod B to the
prover.
2. The prover responds with {=0 if dist(x, L(B))<dist(x, L(B)+v) and
{=1 otherwise.
3. The verifier accepts if and only if {=_.
One can easily verify that if dist(v, L(B))>gd, then there exist no vectors ’0 , ’1
each of length at most gd2 so that ’0#’1+v (mod B). On the other hand, if
dist(v, L(B))d, then the probability that the prover can fool the verifier is upper
bounded by the statistical difference between the random variables ’ mod B and
’+v mod B. The latter is upper bounded by the statistical difference between the
random variables ’ and ’+v$, where v$ is shortest so that v&v$ # L(B), which in
turn is upper bounded in Section 3.
The proof system for the complement of GapSVPg . On input (B, d ), where B is
a basis in Rn, and d # R, let g=g(n).
1. The verifier uniformly selects c # [0, 1]n, and an error vector, ’, uniformly
distributed in a sphere of radius gd2. The verifier sends x =def Bc+’ mod 2B to the
prover. (By 2B we mean the basis resulting from B by multiplying each vector by 2.)
2. The prover responds with c$ # [0, 1]n minimizing dist(x, Bc$+L(2B)).
3. The verifier accepts if and only if c$=c.
One can easily verify that if the shortest (non-zero) vector in L(B) is longer than
gd, then there exist no vectors ’, ’$ each of length at most gd2 and c{c$ # [0, 1]n
so that ’+Bc#’$+Bc$ (mod 2B). On the other hand, if the shortest (non-zero)
vector in L(B) has length at most d, then for this vector, denoted Bz, at least one
of the coordinates in z is odd (or else Bz is not shortest). We can pair each
c # [0, 1]n with c$=c+z mod 2 (which by the above is different from c), and upper
560 GOLDREICH AND GOLDWASSER
bound the probability that the prover can fool the verifier by the statistical dif-
ference between the random variables ’+Bc mod 2B and ’+Bc$ mod 2B (or,
equiv., ’ and ’+Bz). The latter is upper bounded exactly as in Section 4.
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